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Summary
Background: A bioterrorist release of smallpox is a constant threat to the population of the USA
and other countries.
Design: A stochastic simulation model of the spread of smallpox due to a large bioterrorist attack
in a structured population was constructed. Disease natural history parameter estimates, time
lines of behavioral activities, and control scenarios were based on the literature and on the
consensus opinion of a panel of smallpox experts.
Results: The authors found that surveillance and containment, i.e., isolation of known cases and
vaccination of their close contacts, would be sufficient to effectively contain a large intentional
smallpox release. Given that surveillance and containment measures are in place, preemptive
vaccination of hospital workers would further reduce the number of smallpox cases and deaths
but would require large numbers of prevaccinations. High levels of reactive mass vaccination
after the outbreak begins would further reduce smallpox cases and deaths to a minimum, but
would require even larger numbers of vaccinations. Reactive closure of schools would have a
minimal effect.
Conclusion: A rapid and well-organized response to a bioterrorist attack would be necessary for
effective surveillance and containment to control spread. Preemptive vaccination of hospital
workers and reactive vaccination of the target population would further limit spread, but at a cost* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 206 667 2721; fax: +1 206 667 4812.
E-mail address: longini@scharp.org (I.M. Longini Jr.).
1201-9712/$32.00 # 2006 International Society for Infectious Diseases. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijid.2006.03.002
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of many more vaccinated. This cost in resources and potential harm due to vaccination will have
to be weighed against the potential benefits should an attack occur. Prevaccination of the general
population is not necessary.
# 2006 International Society for Infectious Diseases. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.Introduction
The intentional release of smallpox remains a threat to the
American population.1,2 Our earlier work3 showed that for a
small attack involving around five initial infectives, post-
release targeted vaccination of close contacts of identified
infected people would be sufficient to control the epidemic.
Our result is supported by other investigators using a simpler
model.4 There ismodeling evidence that a large attackmay be
difficult to contain.5 A stochastic model of a large smallpox
attack indicates that targeted vaccination combined with
early detection may be effective without resorting to mass
vaccination.6 Other work, not based on a dynamic epidemic
model, suggests that given the small probability of a bioter-
rorist smallpox attack, preemptive mass vaccination is not a
good strategy as opposed to reactive containment strategies.7
Our earlier work also showed that preemptive voluntary
vaccination to increase herd immunity could increase the
effectiveness of a surveillance and containment control strat-
egy, but further investigationwouldbeneeded for the caseof a
large attack. Currently there is virtually no effort to vaccinate
the civilian population in the USA. The federal government
goal to vaccinate 5—10 million first responders and hospital
personnel preemptively by the summer of 2003 was not
achieved.8 Even the more modest plan to vaccinate 500 000
medical personnel has not been achieved.9 As of October 31,
2005, about 40 000 people had been vaccinated,10 and many
states had paused their smallpox vaccination program pending
further federal government guidance. Routine vaccination
against smallpox in the USA was stopped in 1972, currently
leaving at least 43% of the population of the USA completely
susceptible. However, evidence suggests that substantial resi-
dual immunity remains in those previously vaccinated,11 and
such immunity would give partial protection against severe
disease and death given infection.12
In this work, we address the question of whether post-
release surveillance and containment, i.e., isolation of
detected smallpox cases, and location and vaccination of their
close contacts, would be sufficient to contain even a large
smallpox release, given the current level of background immu-
nity to smallpox in the population of the USA.We also examine
the added benefit of prevaccination of hospital workers,
reactive mass vaccination of the population after an attack
has been detected, and reactive closing of the schools.
Materials and methods
Many of the parameters and scenarios of our model were
determined by the Smallpox Modeling Working Group, The
Secretary’s Advisory Council on Public Health Preparedness,
Department of Health and Human Services.13 Parameter
values and modeling decisions made by the working group
were based on the group’s collective knowledge of smallpox
epidemiology and on information from Chapter 4 of Smallpoxand its eradication by Fenner et al.14 The simulation model
developed here is a direct extension of our previous model,3
but for a larger population and potential attack. In addition,
through the working group, we were able to derive a more
accurate set of natural history parameters than for the
previous model. The smallpox natural history and human
behavior patterns that we give in the next section represent
a blending of values from the literature and expert opinion
that may be the most comprehensive description up to this
time.
Natural history, behavior, and control measures
Wedescribed the natural history of smallpox in terms of three
time lines (Figure 1): (1) disease symptoms and recognition,
(2) infectiousness, and (3) behavior of infected people. We
also partitioned smallpox cases into three categories: (1)
ordinary smallpox (Figure 1), (2) modified smallpox
(Figure 2), and (3) hemorrhagic smallpox (Figure 3). For
those who have never been vaccinated, we assumed that
95% would develop ordinary smallpox if infected, and the
remaining 5% would develop hemorrhagic smallpox if
infected. For those people over 32 years of age who were
vaccinated before 1971, we assumed that 10% would be fully
protected against smallpox infection, 30% would develop a
less severe modified case of smallpox if infected, and the
remaining 60% would develop non-modified smallpox if
infected. Among that 60%, 95% of the cases would be ordinary
smallpox and 5% hemorrhagic smallpox. About 57% of the
population of the USA was born before 1971. We divided our
simulated outbreaks into two periods. The first period is
before recognition of smallpox, while the second period is
after the first case of smallpox is recognized.
Figure 1 shows the natural history for ordinary smallpox.
The incubation period distribution was assumed to vary from 7
to 17 days with a mean of 11.48 days. The incubation period
was assumed to end with the onset of fever, followed by a
macular rash on the 4th day of fever, with subsequent onset of
papules and then vesicles. Before smallpox is known to be
present, smallpox cases would not be recognized as such until
the onset of vesicles, seven days after the onset of fever. After
smallpox is known to be present, cases would be recognized at
the onset of papules, six days after the onset of fever. Thirty
percent of the cases would die 7—14 days after the onset of
fever. People have varying degrees of transmission capabilities
over the course of their infectious period, as shown in Figure 1.
According to this pattern, 92% of an infected person’s infec-
tiousness occurs after the onset of the macular rash, an
assumption consistent with a recent statistical analysis of
smallpox infectivity.15 Figure 1 shows that 47.5% of the cases
wouldwithdraw to the homeat theend of thefirst day of fever,
and 47.5%would go to the hospital at that time. The remaining
5%would continue to circulate but go to the hospital at the end
of the third day of fever.
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Figure 1 The natural history of ordinary smallpox in terms of time lines. Parameter values were determined through group consensus
from the Smallpox Modeling Working Group and Chapter 4 of Fenner et al.14 The length of the incubation period follows the probability
distribution shown in the top line. At the end of the incubation period, cases develop a fever, and then pass though a series of disease
states. Before smallpox is recognized in the hospital (i.e., the first period), an ordinary case of smallpox would be recognized on the
fourth day of rash. After this (i.e., the second period), smallpox is known to be present and all ordinary smallpox would be recognized in
the hospital on the third day of rash. For infectiousness, the per contact transmission probability x (Table 1), is set to 1x for the first day
of fever, increased to 2x for the second day of fever, 4x at the onset of rash, etc., with an upper limit of 1.0. Thirty percent of ordinary
smallpox cases would die between days 7 and 14, according to a uniform distribution. In the behavior time line, cases withdraw to the
home or go to the hospital according to the pattern indicated. In surveillance and containment, close contacts of identified cases are
vaccinated.We modeled modified smallpox to have a similar incuba-
tion period to that of ordinary smallpox, but a milder course
of disease with only a 10% case fatality rate (Figure 2). The
infectiousness of people with modified smallpox would be
33% of that for people with ordinary smallpox. Hemorrhagic
smallpox was modeled to have a shorter natural history and
more severe disease progression than ordinary smallpox with
a 100% case fatality rate (Figure 3). Infected people would
begin internal bleeding four days after the onset of fever, and
die on the seventh day after the onset of bleeding. Before
smallpox is known to be present, we assumed that 50% of
hemorrhagic smallpox cases would not be recognized and 50%
would be recognized on the fifth day of fever. After smallpox
is known to be present, all hemorrhagic cases would be
recognized on the fourth day of fever. People with hemor-
rhagic smallpox would be five times more infectious than
those with ordinary smallpox.The population
The model populations are based on a 50 000 person network
of structured subpopulations of 2000 people mixing in house-
holds, clusters of households, neighborhoods, preschool
groups, schools, and the community at large. The age dis-
tribution and approximate household sizes were based on the
US Census 2000.8 The subpopulations are connected through
adult workplaces and high schools, and the whole population
through a hospital. We include one hospital since statistics
show there is about one hospital per 50 000 people in the
USA.13 The hospital has a total of 686 workers, 133 of whom
can make close contact with smallpox cases until isolation
measures in the hospital are instituted, based on a review of
the numbers of employees having routine contact with
patients.13 Each person in the population may visit the
hospital with probability 0.001 each day. They mix with all
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Figure 2 The natural history of modified smallpox in terms of time lines. Modified smallpox is assumed to have the same incubation
period as ordinary smallpox, but to have a milder course of disease. The infectiousness of people with modified smallpox would be 33%
of that for people with ordinary smallpox, with a case fatality rate of 10%. However, it would be harder to recognize modified smallpox
and cases would be slower to withdraw to the home or go to the hospital than for ordinary smallpox. Before smallpox is recognized in
the hospital (i.e., the first period), 75% of cases would be recognized on the fourth day of rash and the remaining 25% on the seventh day
of rash. After this, the smallpox is known to be present (i.e., the second period), and all ordinary smallpox would be recognized in the
hospital on the third day of rash.infected people in the hospital in the first period before
smallpox is recognized, but only with unisolated circulating
cases during the second period after smallpox is recognized.
Figure 4A shows a schematic of the configuration of a sub-
population of 2000 people. Figure 4B shows how the sub-
populations are connected through schools, workplaces, and
a hospital to form the population of 50 000 people.
The simulation model
We developed a discrete-time, stochastic simulation model
of smallpox spread within a structured population described
above. As mentioned above, the model is an extension of our
previous smallpox model,16 but for a larger population and
with a more detailed disease natural history description. The
model represents the number of close and casual contacts
that a typical person makes in the course of a day. The basic
person-to-person daily transmission probabilities, x, and
mixing group sizes are given in Table 1. We define x as the
probability that an infected person with ordinary smallpox,
on the second day after the onset of fever, makes sufficientcontact to infect an unvaccinated susceptible person in the
mixing group being modeled. For example, if a child were
infected with ordinary smallpox, the probability that this
child would infect an unvaccinated adult in the household,
one day after the onset of fever, would be 0.05. On the third
day after the onset of fever, this probability would increase to
0.10 (see infectiousness time line in Figure 1). The transmis-
sion probability would be 0.20 for days 4—9, and it would drop
back down to 0.10 for days 10—14. People who complete the
full course of disease without dying are considered to be
immune.
Each day, for each susceptible, the probability of becom-
ing infected is calculated based on his vaccination status,
who is infectious in his or her mixing groups, and his or her
vaccination status, as well as the mixing group-specific
transmission probabilities. As an example, consider the
simplest case that no one is vaccinated and we ignore the
complex natural history of smallpox for illustrative pur-
poses. An elementary school child is exposed to the number
of child and adult infectives in his household Ihc and Iha, his
household cluster Ikc and Ika, his school Is, his neighborhood
102 I.M. Longini Jr. et al.
Figure 3 The natural history of hemorrhagic smallpox in terms of time lines. Hemorrhagic smallpox is assumed to have a shorter
natural history and more severe disease progression than ordinary smallpox. Infected people would begin internal bleeding four days
after the onset of fever, and 100% would die on the seventh day after the onset of bleeding. Before smallpox is recognized, we assumed
that 50% of hemorrhagic smallpox cases would not be recognized and 50% would be recognized on the fifth day of fever. After smallpox
is recognized, all hemorrhagic cases would be recognized on the fourth day of fever.In, and the community Im with corresponding transmission
probabilities for each contact of xhcc (child-to-child), xhac
(adult-to-child), . . . respectively. Then, symbolically, the
probability P for that child to become infected on that
day is:
P ¼ 1 ð1 xhccÞIhcð1 xhacÞIhað1 xkccÞIkcð1 xkacÞIka
 ð1 xsÞIsð1 xnÞInð1 xmÞIm :
This equation is evaluated term-by-term in order to iden-
tify the source of infection if an infection occurs. Once
infected, a person passes through the natural history of the
infection process (Figures 1—3). The length of the incuba-
tion period is randomly selected from the probability
distributions. The rest of the disease progression follows
deterministically as indicated in the Figures. Aspects of the
infected person’s behavior, such as if and when he or she
withdraws to the home or goes to the hospital, are simu-
lated stochastically according to the probability distribu-
tions in Figures 1—3. The model assumes the same contact
structure each day of the simulation with the exception of
trips to the hospital.We created a person-to-person graph of our population by
constructing a contact structure proportional to the trans-
mission probabilities given in Table 1. The resulting weighted
graph has an average clustering coefficient of 0.48, much
larger than the average clustering coefficient of 103 of an
Erdo¨s—Re´nyi random graph with the same number of vertices
and average degree.17 The average shortest path was four
people. This large clustering coefficient and small average
shortest path, suggest that we have a small world person-to-
person contact graph.17,18 This indicates that the smallpox
transmission will tend to infect close-knit groups such as
households, daycare centers, and schools when introduced,
and then remain confined to these groups for a few genera-
tions of transmission. After this, transmission will tend to
jump to somewhat more socially distant groups in a sporadic
fashion. This pattern of local clustering followed by larger
jumps, makes smallpox susceptible to perifocal control
efforts, such as surveillance and containment. This is in
contrast to the rapid uniform transmission that would occur
if the contact structure of the person-to-person graph was
more like a random graph, i.e., random mixing. In this case,
perifocal control measures would probably tend to fail.5
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Figure 4 Structure of the populations. (A) The 2000 person subpopulations consist of households and household social clusters
depicted by the connecting lines in neighborhood 2. Each subpopulation is partitioned into four neighborhoods. Small children mix in
playgroups and daycare centers within their neighborhoods. The school mixing groups link neighborhoods as shown. (B) Clusters of the
subpopulations are created by allowing ten percent of high school students in each of the clusters of subpopulations to mix with high
schools in other subpopulations in the same cluster. All adults who work are randomly assigned to work in mixing groups of size 25
throughout the whole population. In addition, all people can attend a single hospital.
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Table 1 Daily transmission probabilities, x,a among children and adults, by mixing group, and group sizes
Contact group Mean size Children Adults
Pre-school School
Small playgroup Large daycare Elementary Middle High
Small playgroups 2.9 0.03000
Large day-care centers 15.8 0.02000
Elementary school 77.8 0.01000
Middle school 145.3 0.00800
High school 113.7 0.00800
Family 2.5
Child 0.03520 0.03520 0.03520 0.03520 0.03520 0.01240
Adult 0.01240 0.01240 0.01240 0.01240 0.01240 0.01510
Household social cluster 10.1
Child 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000 0.03000 0.01000
Adult 0.01000 0.01000 0.01000 0.01000 0.01000 0.01000
Hospital
Smallpox ward 133.0
Worker—worker 0.00200
Worker—visitor 0.00200 0.00200 0.00200 0.00200 0.00200 0.00200
Patient—worker 0.00010 0.00010 0.00010 0.00010 0.00010 0.00010
Patient—visitor 0.00010 0.00010 0.00010 0.00010 0.00010 0.00010
Other wards 533.0 0.00050
Workgroup 0.01000
Neighborhood 500.0 0.00004 0.00004 0.00005 0.00005 0.00005 0.00014
Community 2000.0 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00003
a The probability that an infected person with ordinary smallpox, on the second day after the onset of fever, makes sufficient contact to
infect an unvaccinated susceptible person in the mixing group being modeled.Interventions
For those people who receive a fresh smallpox vaccination
before they are infected, we assumed the vaccine efficacy is
0.97, and that response to vaccination is all-or-none.19 For
those who receive a fresh vaccination four days post-infec-
tion, we assumed that 90% would not develop disease and 10%
would develop modified smallpox. For those vaccinated
between 5—7 days post-infection, 60% would develop mod-
ified smallpox, 38% ordinary smallpox, and 2% hemorrhagic
smallpox. Vaccination reduces the death rate of break-
through infections, for old vaccinations or fresh vaccinations
4—7 days post-infection, to a very low level, i.e., 1% or less.
We evaluated a number of intervention strategies. The
most basic for traditional smallpox control has been surveil-
lance and containment, also referred to as targeted or ringTable 2 Smallpox simulation scenarios
Scenario
1 2 Baseline
Background immunity +a +
Surveillance and containment Isolation but n
Pre-emptive vaccination
Pre-emptive vaccination (hospital-only)
Reactive school closure 10 days
Mass reactive vaccination
a The + indicates that the factor is present.vaccination, which is part of the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention response plan.20 For this control strategy,
when the first case of smallpox is recognized, all hospital
workers who deal with smallpox cases would be immediately
vaccinated. Recognized cases of smallpox would be placed in
hospital-based isolation, and their close contacts would be
vaccinated and kept under observation. These close contacts
would be those people in the recognized case’s household
and, when appropriate, in the case’s household social cluster,
daycare center, school group, or workplace. Contacts in the
neighborhood or the community at large would not be con-
sidered to be close contacts and not be isolated. Children
under one year of age are not vaccinated.
We considered mass reactive vaccination where vaccina-
tion would begin one day after recognition of the first case of
smallpox, and would take seven days to complete to a3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
+ + + + + + + +
o vaccination + + + + + + + +
10% 50% 10% 50% 10% 50% 10%
+ + + + +
40% 40% 80% 80%
Containing a large bioterrorist smallpox attack 105particular level. Smallpox cases are not vaccinated. In addi-
tion, any person freshly vaccinated through contact tracing
or pre-emptive vaccination in the hospital would not be
revaccinated. The schools would serve as vaccination centers
and be closed for that seven-day period. A further strategy
that was considered was the prevaccination of different
proportions of hospital workers. We also considered reactive
closing of the schools for ten days, starting one day after
recognition of the first case of smallpox.
In accordance with the working group, we evaluated a
range of control scenarios (Table 2). The baseline scenario
involved people withdrawing to the home and others being
placed in effective hospital isolation at the appropriate
times, but no contact tracing or vaccination. Scenario 3
was surveillance and containment (with vaccination of close
contacts) alone and then scenarios 4—10 involved surveil-
lance and containment plus various additional control mea-
sures including pre-emptive vaccination of hospital workers,
reactive mass vaccination, and reactive school closings.
Scenarios 1 and 2 involved no interventions and were used
to help validate the simulations.
For the attack scenario we assumed that 500 randomly
selected people are initially infected. For each intervention
scenario, 100 epidemics were stochastically simulated.
Results
Calibration of the model was based on historical data avail-
able on smallpox, including household secondary attack
rates,14 relative age-specific attack rates being higher in
children,21 and the distribution of secondary cases produced
by an introductory case.14,22 We roughly calibrated the
transmission probabilities in households to observed house-
hold secondary attack rates from past smallpox epidemics.
These ranged from 44% to 88% to unvaccinated people in a
variety of populations in Africa and South Asia in the 1960s
and 1970s.14,22 For example, we set the child-to-adult house-
hold daily transmission probability x to 0.05. Using the
information in Figure 1, if the infected child remained in
the household over his entire infectious period, then theFigure 5 A plot showing the relationship between the trans-
mission probability x during the second day of fever from an
unvaccinated case of smallpox to an exposed unvaccinated
person in a mixing group and the maximum household secondary
attack (SAR) rate if he circulated in the mixing group for his
entire infectious period. This relationship is based on the small-
pox natural histories given in Figures 1—3.probability that he would infect the exposed adult would be
0.85 (i.e., household secondary attack rate of 85%). However,
in reality the household secondary attack rate would be
lower as the infected child would be placed in isolation when
recognized as a smallpox case. Thus, 85% is the maximum
household secondary attack rate. If the index infected child
had modified smallpox, then the maximum secondary attack
rate for child-to-adult transmission in the household would
be 46%, and if the index case had hemorrhagic smallpox, then
the maximum secondary attack rate would be 100%. These
relationships are shown in Figure 5. The maximum secondary
attack rate for other mixing groups is illustrated on this plot.
Figure 6A shows the first 60 days of one stochastically
simulated smallpox epidemic with 500 randomly selected
initially infected people from all age groups in the population
for surveillance and containment (scenario 3), while
Figure 6B shows the same for surveillance and containment
plus preemptive hospital worker vaccination at 50%, and
reactive school closing and mass vaccination at 80% (scenario
9). Figure 6A and B show that the model reproduces the
characteristic epidemic waves of smallpox roughly every two
weeks. Although an outbreak is not prevented, it is reduced
to a low level.
Table 3 shows the number of cases not counting the initial
cases when surveillance and containment, which includesFigure 6 The first 60 days of one stochastically simulated
smallpox epidemic with 500 randomly selected initially infected
people from all age groups. (A) Epidemic surveillance and con-
tainment (scenario 3). This epidemic had a duration of 196 days,
while the average duration of the epidemics under scenario 3was
194 days. (B) Epidemic with surveillance and containment, 50%
preemptive hospital vaccination and 80% reactive mass vaccina-
tion with reactive school closure for ten days (scenario 9). This
epidemic had a duration of 91 days, while the average duration
of epidemics under scenario 9 was 87 days.
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Table 3 Distribution of cases excluding initial cases for
surveillance and containment with vaccination of close con-
tacts (scenario 3)a
Source of cases Cases
Mean Q1b Q3b
Household 82 70 93
Neighborhood cluster 62 50 72
Daycare 6 3 8
Schools 101 78 120
Workgroup 60 19 87
Hospital (smallpox ward) 413 362 463
General neighborhood 52 44 60
Community 54 46 63
Total c 828 694 935
a Based on 100 simulations.
b Q1: first quartile; Q3: third quartile.
c A small number of people may have been infected from more
than one source.
Table 4 Average distribution of the sources of infection for
smallpox cases with surveillance and containment (scenario 3),
compared to the distribution observed in European epidemics,
1950—1971
Location Model European
Hospital 50% 50%
Family or other close contact 18% 22%
Workplace or school 19% 14%
Unknown source 13% 14%vaccination of close contacts (scenario 3), is instituted. The
total number of cases averages 828, with 50% of the cases
from the hospital, 18% from the family or other close con-
tacts, 19% from schools or the workplace, and 13% from the
neighborhoods and community at large. This latter 13% of
infecting contacts would be untraceable. These percentages
are quite close to those observed for European smallpox
epidemics for 1950—1971 (Table 4).
Table 5 gives the numbers of smallpox cases and deaths for
the baseline and for scenarios 3—10. (Results for scenarios 1
and 2 are not in the Table 5, but are given below.) If the only
action were the isolation of cases (baseline scenario), then
the model predicts an average of 1750 cases and 523 deaths.
If we add vaccination and carry out surveillance and contain-
ment (scenario 3), then the average number of cases would
be reduced to 828 and the number of deaths to 211. Figure 6A
indicates that for surveillance and containment there would
be a relatively large second wave of cases after the initial
wave, and then a much smaller third and fourth wave.
Preemptive vaccination of 10% of hospital workers in additionTable 5 Scenario results, excluding the 500 initial casesa
Scenario: action Cases
Mean Q1b
Baseline 1750 1527
3: SCc 828 694
4: SC + PHV10% 768 653
5: SC + PHV50% 678 595
6: SC + PHV10% + RSC + RMV40% 439 390
7: SC + PHV50% + RSC + RMV40% 367 341
8: SC + PHV10% + RSC + RMV80% 253 218
9: SC + PHV50% + RSC + RMV80% 203 185
10: SC + PHV10% + RSC 712 152
PHV, pre-emptive hospital vaccination; RSC, reactive school closure; R
a Based on 100 simulations.
b Q1: first quartile; Q3: third quartile.
c SC, surveillance and containment with vaccination of close contactto surveillance and containment (scenario 4) has a small
effect on the average number of cases; however, preemptive
vaccination of 50% of the hospital workers (scenario 5) has a
relatively large effect on reducing the number of cases.
Reactive mass vaccination of 40% of the susceptible popula-
tion (scenarios 6 and 7) has a large additional effect. On
average, 80% reactive mass vaccination (scenarios 8 and 9) is
the most effective in reducing the outbreak to a minimal
number of cases. By comparing scenarios 4 and 10, we see
that reactive closing of the schools for ten days is not
particularly effective.
Table 6 gives the numbers of fresh smallpox vaccinations
for scenarios 3—10. Under surveillance and containment
(scenario 3), an average of 7501 fresh doses of vaccine would
be used, far fewer than the25 500 doses that would be used
under 40% reactive mass vaccination plus surveillance and
containment and preemptive hospital vaccination (scenarios
6 and 7) or the 45 000 doses that would be used under 80%
reactive mass vaccination plus surveillance and containment
and preemptive hospital vaccination (scenarios 8 and 9). The
average number of doses used with surveillance and contain-
ment decreases with increasing level of preemptive hospital
worker vaccination, since the total number of vaccinations
due to contact tracing is decreased due to fewer cases. This
can be seen by comparing the number of vaccine doses
needed for scenarios 3—5.
For orientation purposes, we ran the simulator assuming
no prior immunity, no interventions, and that cases do not
withdraw to the home or go to the hospital (scenario 1).Deaths
Q3b Mean Q1 Q3
1427 523 455 584
935 211 173 239
872 197 168 231
750 180 156 206
474 96 84 107
394 83 73 91
276 38 32 44
219 33 29 38
798 182 152 206
MV, reactive mass vaccination.
s.
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Table 6 Number of vaccine dosesa
Scenario Doses
Mean Q1b Q3b
3 7501 6825 7966
4 7221 6542 7772
5 6725 6231 7185
6 25 677 25 481 25 856
7 25 472 25 267 25 667
8 45 246 45 203 45 284
9 45 214 45 178 45 262
10 6888 6336 7357
a Based on 100 simulations.
b Q1: first quartile; Q3: third quartile.Nearly the entire population is infected, an average of 49 500
cases. This result is expected since infected people are
modeled to circulate in the community over their entire
infectious period. The average number of deaths is 16 598
people. The addition of prior immunity (scenario 2) makes a
small difference in the number of cases, averaging 46 643
people. Prior immunity makes a larger difference in the
number of deaths, an average of 13 681. This decrease is
mostly due to the increased number of modified smallpox
cases among those people previously vaccinated. In addi-
tion, by comparing the baseline average of 1750 cases to
the average of 46 643 cases under scenario 2, we see the
great effectiveness of people with early smallpox symptoms
simply withdrawing to the home and entering hospital
isolation.
Table 7 shows the results of a sensitivity analysis where we
vary the time it takes to recognize a case and begin isolation
of the case and vaccination of close contacts under the
surveillance and containment scenario 3 (see case recogni-
tion days in Figures 1—3). This further delay could be the
result of some cases not being caught quickly, confusion
about smallpox symptoms, or some other problem with the
medical response. If we delay an additional day, the number
of cases and deaths doubles. More than one day further delay
would result in a further approximately 50% increase in the
number of cases and deaths.Table 7 Surveillance and containment for various delays in
case recognition, excluding the 500 initial casesa
Additional delay in
recognition (days)
Cases Deaths
Mean Q1b Q3b Mean Q1 Q3
Current modelc
(no additional delay)
828 694 935 211 173 239
1 1681 1509 1848 416 370 459
2 2017 1879 2162 503 461 533
3 2217 1995 2373 578 522 625
4 2372 2081 2601 658 585 720
5 2786 2574 3007 780 720 841
a Based on 100 simulations.
b Q1: first quartile; Q3: third quartile.
c Model default: smallpox cases are recognized in the hospital
either seven days (ordinary and modified cases) or four days (hemor-
rhagic cases) after onset of fever.Discussion
This work suggests that the current federal government
policy of post-release surveillance and containment, if effec-
tively implemented, could be sufficient to contain either a
small or large intentional release of smallpox. We have shown
that reactive mass vaccination in addition to surveillance and
containment during an attack results in fewer cases and
deaths than surveillance and containment alone. However,
many more people would need to be vaccinated for reactive
mass vaccination than for surveillance and containment.
Since the risk of vaccine-related illness is about 104 and
vaccine related death is about 106,2 one would expect an
average of 2.5—4.5 vaccine-related illnesses and a small
probability that one person would die due to vaccination
for the reactive mass vaccination strategies considered here.
If logistically possible, implementation of reactive mass
vaccination would make sense. Prevaccination of hospital
workers results in somewhat smaller outbreaks in the event
of an attack. However, since it is not known when or where an
attack may occur, prevaccination strategies would require
that large numbers of people be vaccinated throughout the
entire country. This is true of any prevaccination program
before an attack. Such programs either for hospital workers
and first responders or for the general population may not be
necessary given the effectiveness of surveillance and con-
tainment that could be carried out at the location of an
attack. The benefits of such prevaccination need to be
weighed against the potential harm that would ensue due
to vaccine-related injury. The quantitative validity of the
above statements depends on the assumptions, parameter
values, and model structure that we have used here. How-
ever, our general conclusions should be robust to this uncer-
tainty.
Children under one year of age do not receive smallpox
vaccine. However, in the absence of maternal antibodies,
young children are at very high risk of serious disease and
death if they contract smallpox. This makes the surveillance
and containment policy very important for these children
since the rapid vaccination of family members of index cases
and of school children affords very young child indirect
protection.
To assess the robustness of our conclusions about the
effectiveness of control strategies modeled, we carried out
a number of sensitivity analyses not given in the results.
The total number of smallpox cases was found to be
sensitive to variation in the transmission probabilities x
in the different mixing groups. However, the relative
effectiveness of the control strategies was not affected
across the range from small to larger values of x. The most
sensitive factor was timing of withdrawal to the home and
isolation of cases. A delay in recognition of cases by one or
more days beyond the hypothesized control strategy out-
lined in Figures 1—3 was found to result in poorly contained
simulated epidemics (Table 7). The sensitivity analysis also
reflects uncertainty about the exact onset of infectiousness
relative to symptoms, since earlier than hypothesized
onset of infectiousness would be equivalent to a delay in
isolation. This result is consistent with a previous modeling
exercise that showed logistical delays in fully implement-
ing surveillance and containment could lead to a large
outbreak.5
108 I.M. Longini Jr. et al.We created a 50 000 personmodel population based on the
US census 2000 information and our conception of how a
typical American population is connected in terms of poten-
tial smallpox transmission. To assess whether we have the
approximate connectivity of a typical US population, we
compared our person-to-person graph to the graph that
was constructed from individual level daily travel and loca-
tion visited survey data from Portland, Oregon, with a popu-
lation of 1.6 million people.6 The average clustering
coefficient for both graphs is 0.48. This indicates that the
degree to which the two populations are clustered into close
mixing groups such as households, schools, and workplaces is
similar. The mean shortest path for the Portland population
was six, while it is four for our population. Thus, the links
between clusters for our population are somewhat shorter
than those in Portland. Both our graph and the one for
Portland are small world with similar characteristics.
Although our population is smaller than the Portland popula-
tion, the connectivity of any person with others in the
population is roughly similar for the two populations. Thus,
we believe that our simulation population of 50 000 people is
large enough to investigate the effectiveness of the various
containment strategies against a large attack.
Our previous modeling work has shown that surveillance
and containment would be effective in containing and some-
times preventing a smallpox outbreak for a small number of
initial cases.3 In this work, using a model with different
epidemiologic parameter values, we show that surveillance
and containment could be effective in containing an out-
break with a large number of initial cases. This suggests that
further prevaccination of the population of the USAwould be
counter-productive. However, a rapid and well-organized
response to a smallpox bioterrorist attack would be needed
to make containment efficient.
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